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It is common for aircraft to conduct visual and instrument final approaches to a single 
runway or multiple parallel runways. Useful, nonexcessive safety alerts on aircraft conducting 
visual approaches are helpful to air traffic controllers, though pilots are responsible for 
separation with the preceding aircraft. A variety of visual approaches to various runway 
configurations are studied, and a set of safety alert thresholds is proposed. Fast-time 
simulations with recorded real-world air traffic data of mostly visual approach flights are 
performed on a prototype tactical separation assurance system for terminal airspace. Alerts 
are generated -- with both the standard separation thresholds and the proposed safety alert 
thresholds -- and compared with those from the Conflict Alert (CA) functionality in the 
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS). The results show that the 
number of Mode-C Intruder alerts generated was reduced 76% as compared to STARS CA. 
The nuisance alerts generated by assuming visual to be instrument approaches was reduced 
by 92% when the proposed safety alert thresholds were used and visual approaches were 
assumed. 
I. Introduction 
oday air traffic controllers are responsible for separation of air traffic, utilizing decision support tools at their 
disposal. Both the CARTS (Common Automated Radar Terminal System)1 and the newer STARS (Standard 
Terminal Automation Replacement System)2 have a Conflict Alert (CA) functionality that alerts the air traffic 
controller when two aircraft get dangerously close in the US terminal airspace. The dangerous proximity1,2 refers 
approximately to a horizontal separation of 1 NM and a vertical separation of 300 ft. However, losses of standard 
separation, which is typically a horizontal separation of 3 NM and a vertical separation of 1000 ft in terminal airspace 
with various other criteria such as wake turbulence as defined in FAA Order JO 7110.65V,3 have been a significant 
safety concern, for which the CA functionality was not designed. An automated alerting function based on standard 
separation would spare air traffic controllers unnecessary and imprecise manual estimations of losses of separation 
and thus ensure safer terminal operations.  
 The inherent complexities of terminal airspace operations pose a number of challenges in the development of tools 
that automatically alert the air traffic controller to potential separation conflicts. Routine large-angle turns before final 
approaches requires proper handling to prevent a proliferation of nuisance alerts. Spacing aircraft near standard 
separation thresholds to maximize arrival and departure throughput increases the difficulty of predicting separation 
conflicts without causing too many false alerts. The difficulty also stems from the dynamic and complex nature of the 
standard separation criteria, which depend on relative course heading, weight classes, locations along the localizer, 
and other factors.3 Further challenge, as explained in the next section, comes from the need to provide safety alerts for 
potential conflicts involving aircraft conducting visual approaches to a single runway or multiple parallel runways 
simultaneously.  
 Recently a prototype system called the Terminal Tactical Separation-Assured Flight Environment (T-TSAFE) has 
been developed4. T-TSAFE takes into account available flight intent information for predicting aircraft trajectories 
and employs a single-trajectory algorithm for conflict detection. T-TSAFE alerts the controller to predicted losses of 
separation based on the standard separation criteria with a look-ahead time of about two minutes. Analysis shows that 
T-TSAFE has an average alert lead time of ~30 seconds (to first loss of separation) and a false alert rate of ~10% of 
the total alerts.5 Here a false alert refers to a predicted alert of loss of separation that does not materialize and there is 
no indication of any controller or pilot intervention action. T-TSAFE and CARTS CA have been compared using a 
full day of recorded traffic from Southern California TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control), including aircraft 
tracks both associated and unassociated with flightplans.6 Flights of the associated tracks include a mixture of visual 
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and Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach flights. The result shows the number of predicted conflict aircraft 
pairs common to both T-TSAFE and CARTS CA is small although T-TSAFE was configured to employ alert 
thresholds based on IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) radar separation standards that are not applicable to visual 
approaches in practice. This is consistent with an 80% nuisance-alert rate of CARTS CA concluded by an FAA 
analysis.7 Here a nuisance alert refers to an alert that draws the attention of the controller but fails to provide useful 
information.7 CARTS CA produces a large number of Mode-C Intruder (MCI) alerts,6 which involves an associated 
and an unassociated aircraft. T-TSAFE is found to produce ~50% less MCI alerts than CARTS CA does.6 Furthermore, 
the result indicates that the expected large number of nuisance alerts from treating visual approach flights as instrument 
flights could be removed with a high-severity alerting option,6 which amounts to an alert threshold of reduced standard 
separation. 
Two concerns need to be further addressed. First, STARS CA is expected to have improved over CARTS CA, so 
it is interesting to compare T-TSAFE with STARS CA as well. Second, there are seemingly different visual approaches 
that are performed at TRACON facilities other than Southern California TRACON (SCT). These visual approaches 
should be examined further. 
Visual approaches to various runway configurations are studied in this paper. A set of safety alert thresholds for 
aircraft conducting visual approaches is proposed based on input of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as well as visual 
approach procedures and common practices. The goal is to maximize the alert thresholds while minimizing nuisance 
alerts with the usage of flight intent information. Fast-time simulations of T-TSAFE with recorded real-world traffic 
data from Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (D10) allows performance comparison with STARS CA as well as 
testing of the safety alert thresholds. The results show T-TSAFE produces far fewer nuisance alerts with a manageable 
total number of alerts. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II focuses on the concepts of visual approaches and safety 
alert thresholds consistent with common practices. Section III describes the experiment and the data used in the 
simulations. Section IV shows the results of analyzing the experimental output. Section V summarizes the findings. 
II. Visual Approach Procedures, Practice, and Alert Thresholds 
 A visual approach is an air traffic control authorization for an aircraft on an IFR flightplan to proceed visually to 
the airport or runway.3 At all times the pilot must have either the airport or the preceding aircraft in sight. Reported 
weather at the airport must be ceiling at or above 1,000 ft with visibility of 3 statute miles or greater.   
A large portion of daily terminal operations involve visual approach aircraft for which controllers are still 
responsible for providing safety alerts.3 Visual approaches help increase capacity under VMC (Visual Meteorological 
Conditions) weather, but they also complicate separation provision. Before making a visual approach clearance, the 
controller makes sure the particular aircraft is not at loss of separation with any other aircraft. After the clearance, the 
pilot becomes responsible for maintaining visual separation with the preceding aircraft on the same or an adjacent 
parallel runway. Maintaining visual separation with a preceding aircraft approaching the same runway also means 
maintaining a separation large enough to guarantee safe landing and avoid go-around. For simultaneous approaches 
to multiple parallel runways, the succeeding visual approach aircraft may not overtake the preceding aircraft if wake 
turbulence separation violation may occur, as when the runway centerline separation is less than 2500 ft. Standard 
IFR radar separation between the visual approach aircraft and other visual or ILS approach aircraft must still be 
maintained. In addition, the controller must also provide safety alerts to any aircraft, visual approach aircraft included, 
that is expected to be placed in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft.3 Thus, an automated air 
traffic system should provide controllers with separation alerts on potential violation of the standard separation, as 
well as safety alerts to help controllers make decision on potentially unsafe situations when visual approach aircraft 
are involved.  
Safety alerts for visual approach aircraft may help prevent inadvertent errors as well. For example, a visual 
approach aircraft may follow the wrong preceding aircraft. The lack of standard for alerting and the complexity of 
various possible visual approaches make it hard to determine proper alert thresholds for safety alerts. The CA 
functionality of CARTS and STARS issues alerts to controllers when an aircraft gets into dangerous proximity of 
another aircraft. This may help controllers to provide safety alerts when visual approach aircraft are involved. 
However, the percentage of nuisance alerts are too large to be useful.7 Larger alert thresholds than those of CA may 
be adopted as well when flight intent information is used, allowing the controllers more time to respond to the situation.  
T-TSAFE4 predicts separation conflicts between a pair of aircraft using a deterministic kinematic trajectory and 
the standard separation criteria specified in the FAA Order JO 7110.65V.3 The aircraft trajectories are based on current 
states of the aircraft from radar or ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast) track updates and the 
available flight intent information. Track history or historic flight path is needed when wake turbulence is involved so 
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that one can determine if the trailing aircraft is currently directly behind (within 2500 ft of the flight path) and either 
at the same altitude or within 1000 ft below the preceding aircraft. Some specific rules for visual approaches have 
been outlined in FAA Order JO 7110.65V,3 although alert thresholds for visual approach flights are not addressed. 
Previous work5-6 uses a high-severity option, which amounts to alert thresholds reduced from the standard separations, 
for alerting on visual approach aircraft pairs. For aircraft approaching the same runway, the high-severity option 
amounts to alerting when the time to the first loss of non-wake (wake) conformance separation of 0.75 (0.85) is less 
than 40 seconds, which is a time that is typically sufficient for the controller to respond to potential conflicts in terminal 
airspace. The conformance separation is defined as  s =√𝑉𝑟2 + 𝐻𝑟2  where 𝐻r = 𝑟/𝑟min and  𝑉r = ℎ/ℎmin are, 
respectively, the horizontal and vertical separations retained.8 Here r and 𝑟min are, respectively, the horizontal 
separation of the aircraft pair at some instant and the required standard IFR horizontal separation minimum and, 
similarly, h and ℎmin are, respectively, the corresponding vertical values. Conformance separations of operational 
errors of classes A and B correspond to  s ≤ 0.75 for non-wake and  s ≤ 0.85 for wake conflicts. The alert thresholds 
being related to the severities of operational errors reflect the seriousness of the encounters, and they happen to 
coincide with the typical separation of visual approach aircraft pairs (to the same runway) in practice. The ultimate 
test for the alert thresholds should be the time buffer that allows controllers to respond and the nuisance-alert rate from 
testing against real-world traffic data. For aircraft approaching parallel runways, high severity was defined based on 
whether an aircraft was to cross the localizer.6  This needs generalization to accommodate different visual approaches 
of aircraft pairs to multiple parallel runways. 
A. Approach to the Airport or Runway  
An aircraft can be cleared for visual approach to the airport or runway when the pilot reports the airport or runway 
in sight and there are no potential losses of separation with any other aircraft at the time. It may also be cleared for 
visual approach to the runway following the preceding aircraft if the pilot reports sighting the preceding aircraft 
irrespective of the airport or runway being in sight 
or not.3  Figure 1 shows an example of three aircraft 
approaching runway 24R at LAX (Los Angeles 
International Airport). Aircraft A1 is on ILS 
approach and is referred to as I4R at SCT. Aircraft 
A2 is cleared for visual approach, referred to as 
V4R, following and maintaining visual separation 
from aircraft A1. Aircraft A3 is cleared for V4R as 
well following and maintaining visual separation 
from aircraft A2. We will generally refer to this 
kind of visual approach as VA in what follows. 
VA aircraft pairs approach the same runway successively with visual separation, and the separation maintained 
must be large enough to allow safe landing. Based on input from SMEs, and confirmed from real-world traffic data 
as well, aircraft pairs on VA typically maintain a separation of about 2.2 NM or more when they are at the same level 
and when a standard 3 NM ILS separation is required if they are on ILS approaches. This corresponds approximately 
to the conformance separation of 0.75 for non-wake conflicts. It is at the border of a class B operational error when 
standard separation applies and may be a good point to draw the attention of the controllers so they may decide if a 
safety alert to the pilot is necessary. This would be useful to controllers as long as the number of alerts is not excessive 
and there are not too many false alerts. Testing against real-world traffic data will verify if this is the case. Thus, we 
propose a safety alert threshold for VA aircraft pairs when a minimum conformance non-wake separation of 0.75 or 
wake separation of 0.85 is violated within 40 seconds. Again, 40 seconds is a time that is typically sufficient for 
controllers to respond to a potential conflict in terminal airspace. Fine tuning of the thresholds can be done in the 
actual system as long as it is within the safe practice and no proliferating nuisance alerts are generated. 
B. Approach to Parallel Runways 
Visual approaches to parallel runways are generally described in Section 7-4-4 of FAA Order JO 7110.65V.3 Here 
the relevant procedures for different separations of runway centerlines from Ref. 3 are summarized while the safety 
thresholds for generating alerts to the controllers are discussed. 
 
1. Runways Separated by Less Than 2500 Feet 
An aircraft may be cleared for visual approach to a runway following, and maintaining visual separation with, a 
preceding aircraft that approaches an adjacent runway less than 2500 ft apart. Once the preceding aircraft, which may 
  
 
Figure 1. Some examples of visual approach to the airport 
or runway at LAX.  
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be on visual or ILS approach, is established on the final, the succeeding aircraft may close up.3 However, a heavy or 
B757 aircraft is not permitted to overtake another aircraft, and a large aircraft is not permitted to overtake a small 
aircraft.  
Figure 2 illustrates an example of aircraft 
approaching parallel runways with centerline 
separation less than 2500 ft. The aircraft approach 
runway 24R and 24L at LAX. Aircraft A2 follows 
ILS-approach aircraft A1 on the adjacent runway 
24R on a visual approach to runway 24L. Aircraft A3 
follows A2 on visual approach to runway 24L, and 
aircraft A4 is on V4R following aircraft A3 on the 
adjacent runway. Aircraft A2 may close up to aircraft 
A1 such that both aircraft approach their runways 
almost side by side. However, if wake turbulence 
applies, the succeeding aircraft would need to be 
above the flight path of the preceding aircraft. 
To provide safety alerts to the controllers, we need to determine proper safety alert thresholds, which may be 
rationalized based on the procedures summarized above. Since runways less than 2500 ft apart are treated as the same 
runway for ILS approaches, before the visual approach aircraft pair is established on their localizers, we should use 
the single runway safety thresholds, i.e. non-wake and wake conformance thresholds of 0.75 and 0.85 respectively 
and less than 40 seconds time to potential conflicts. Once they are established on their finals, alerts are generated only 
when a blunder is expected to occur. A blunder is defined here as a situation in which an aircraft is off and is crossing 
the localizer toward the other runway. A safety alert threshold that may predict and detect a blunder is a conformance 
alert threshold of value 𝑑/𝑟min for aircraft off the localizer, where d is the runway centerline separation and 𝑟min is 
the required standard IFR horizontal radar separation. Heavy or B757 aircraft overtaking another aircraft or large 
overtaking small will be predicted because standard separation alerts will be generated as a result of the violation of 
wake turbulence standards. We should note that we have not observed a real-world encounter for visual parallel 
approaches, with runway centerlines less than 2500 ft apart, in which the succeeding aircraft pulls up too close to the 
preceding aircraft. They typically maintain a separation that conforms with the conformance thresholds of 0.75 or 0.85 
instead. 
Simultaneous ILS approaches to parallel runways separated by less than 2500 ft apart may be conducted, but the 
runways would be treated as a single runway as far as standard separation is concerned. However, an aircraft may be 
cleared for ILS approach to a runway while 
maintaining visual separation with the preceding 
aircraft on the adjacent runway when the pilot reports 
the preceding aircraft in sight. In this case, the 
succeeding aircraft is said to be on VV. Figure 3 
shows such a situation. Aircraft A1, A2, and A3 are 
on ILS approach to runway 24R, and aircraft A4, A5, 
and A6 are on ILS approach to runway 25L. However, 
aircraft A5 maintains a visual separation with aircraft 
A2 since it is on VV. Note that aircraft on VV implies 
it is on ILS approach to the runway. Thus, standard 
separation thresholds apply to aircraft A5 with any 
aircraft other than A2, and only high-severity alerts 
may be generated for the A5 and A2 pair.  
 
2. Parallel Runways Separated by 2500 to 4300 Feet 
Visual approaches may be conducted simultaneously to parallel runways separated by 2500 to 4300 feet. 
According to FAA Order JO 7110.65V,3 standard separation needs to be provided until the aircraft are established on 
a course heading that will intercept the extended centerline of the runway at an angle not greater than 30 degrees. 
Thereafter it is not necessary to apply any other type of separation with aircraft on the adjacent final approach course. 
Thus, each runway localizer may have a stream of visual approach aircraft, and there will not be any alert unless there 
is a blunder in which an aircraft is off the localizer and attempts to cross to the other runway.  
Thus, the appropriate safety alert thresholds in this case may be as follows. Before turn-on to the localizers, high-
severity conformance threshold of 0.75 is used with the time to potential conflicts being less than 40 seconds. Once 
  
 
Figure 2. Visual approach to parallel runways less than 
2500 ft apart at LAX. 
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Figure 3. ILS approach mixed with visual VV approach 
to parallel runways less than 2500 ft apart. 
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both aircraft intercept their localizers with course headings within 30 degrees of the extended centerlines of the 
runways, the threshold reduces to  𝑑/𝑟min and is applied only if one aircraft drifts off the localizer. 
 
3. Parallel Runways Separated by More Than 4300 feet 
Visual approaches may be conducted simultaneously to parallel runways separated by 4300 feet or more. The 
requirement is merely that each aircraft must be assigned a heading that will allow the aircraft to intercept the extended 
centerline of the runway at an angle not greater than 30 degrees.3 It is not necessary to apply any other type of 
separation with aircraft on the adjacent final approach course. Thus, the parallel runways are operated almost 
independently like two separate airports, which are called “complexes” at SCT. In what follows, we will use this 
terminology generally.  
Figure 4 shows multiple aircraft approach 
simultaneously runways 24R and 25L at LAX, 
and they are thus in different complexes. Aircraft 
A1 is on ILS approach to runway 24R. Aircraft 
A2 follows aircraft A1, and aircraft A3 follows 
aircraft A2, on visual approach to runway 24R. 
Aircraft A4 is on visual approach to the airport 
while aircraft A5 is on ILS approach to runway 
25L. The aircraft streams in different complexes 
usually join the localizers from different sides of 
the runways at LAX. SMEs suggest that the 
controllers do not want to see any alerts between 
a VA aircraft in one complex and an ILS 
approach or VA aircraft in another complex, even 
during a turn-on to the localizer, unless a blunder 
is expected to occur.5  
It does not occur frequently that a pair of visual approach aircraft approaches runways in different complexes at 
LAX from the same side. However, in general, aircraft on visual approaches often approach from same or different 
sides of the runways simultaneously. Once the aircraft are established on their finals, there should not be any safety 
alerts generated unless a blunder is expected to occur, because the aircraft operate independently in different 
complexes. But before they are established, when they turn onto their localizers from the same side of the runways, 
or when their flight paths cross each other when they turn onto the localizers from different sides of the runway, some 
safety threshold should be used to alert the controllers of potentially unsafe encounters. Actual examples of these 
situations are discussed in Sec. IV. The safety threshold we propose to use is the conformance alert threshold of value 
equal to min{𝑑/𝑟min, 0.75}, where d is the runway separation and 𝑟min= 3 NM is the standard horizontal separation. 
For example, if the runway separation is 9000 ft, the conformance alert threshold would be 0.5. This threshold applies 
when the aircraft blunders after being established on the final or during the aircraft’s turn-ons to their localizers. The 
value of 0.75 here accounts for possible large runway separations. Note that, if the aircraft turn on to their localizers 
from different sides of the runways and their flight paths do not cross, the safety threshold will never be triggered 
unless one aircraft is predicted to overshoot the localizer. We should also note that alerts could still be generated for 
each independent complex based on the safety thresholds discussed earlier. 
An aircraft may be cleared for ILS approach to 
a landing runway and maintain visual separation 
with a preceding visual or ILS approach aircraft in 
an adjacent runway more than 4300 feet apart. This 
situation is called VS. Figure 5 shows the possible 
simultaneous four–runway visual or ILS 
approaches on the 24 and 25 runways at LAX. 
Aircraft A1 and A2 are on ILS approaches to 
runway 24R and 25R, respectively. Aircraft A3 is 
on V4R following aircraft A1, while aircraft A4 is 
on ILS approach to runway 25L maintaining visual 
separation (VV) with aircraft A2. Aircraft A5 is on 
ILS approach to runway 24R, while aircraft A6 is 
on ILS approach to runway 25L and maintaining 
visual separation (VS) with aircraft A5. In general, 
  
 
 
Figure 4. Some examples of visual and ILS approach to 
runways in different complexes. 
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Figure 5. Some visual approach pairs in two complexes at 
LAX including a visual VS approach pair. 
 
24R
24L
V4R I4R
I4R
A1 A3
A5
25R
25L
VS
VV
I5R
A2
A4 A6
6 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
the VS aircraft pairs could be approaching the final approach courses from the same side of the runways, although at 
LAX they usually approach the runways from the opposite sides. The same safety threshold discussed above applies 
for the VS aircraft pair. For example, when they turn on to their localizers from different sides of the runways with no 
crossing of flight paths as in Fig. 5, no alerts will be generated during turn-on to the localizer unless an overshoot is 
predicted to occur.  
C. Safety Alert Threshold Comparison 
Multiple-runway visual approaches with a mix of visual and ILS approaches can be highly complex as in the case 
of the four-runway two-complex simultaneous approaches at LAX. There is also a variety of safety alert thresholds 
discussed so far. Thus, we summarize and compare them with those of CA in Table 1 below. STARS and CARTS CA 
uses smaller alert thresholds corresponding to d = 0.7 times the runway centerline separation for parallel runway 
approaches; otherwise CA typically uses ~1 NM horizontal separation and ~300 ft vertical separation, which amounts 
to a conformance threshold of  approximately 0.45. In Table 1, we have denoted the time to first conflict or violation 
of the conformance threshold as 𝑡c. For parallel runways with separation between 2500 ft and 4300 ft, the 30º turn-on 
means a turn-on with course headings within 30º of the extended centerlines of the runways. Note again that blunder 
means an aircraft is off the localizer and is heading toward the other parallel runway. Thus, two aircraft turning onto 
their localizers from the same side would not constitute a blunder unless they overshoot. As seen in Table 1, our 
proposed safety alert thresholds are relatively larger than those of CA. As a result, controllers may have longer time 
to respond to such situations. With flight intent information taken into consideration, T-TSAFE also yields larger alert 
lead times. Thus, T-TSAFE may have larger safety buffers. More tests against real-world traffic data may help refine 
the safety alert thresholds. In the next section, we use the air traffic data from D10 on a specific day that involves 
mostly visual approach flights to show that our larger safety thresholds counter-intuitively yield fewer nuisance alerts 
and a smaller total number of alerts. 
III. Experiment 
Fast-time simulation T-TSAFE experiments with real-world air traffic data from D10, including STARS data, 
were performed. Though most of the DFW arriving flights in the data were on visual approaches, the simulations were 
done by assuming the associated flights, with their tracks associated with flightplans, to be conducting first ILS and 
then visual approaches. The performance of T-TSAFE was evaluated by studying the generated MCI and non-MCI 
alerts in comparison with those of STARS CA. 
To study the full benefits of T-TSAFE, we use air traffic data with both associated and unassociated aircraft as 
well as the flightplan information for the associated aircraft. Recorded real-world traffic data of July 26, 2014 from 
D10 were used. Clear VMC weather at Dallas Fort Worth on that day and the fact that all final approach courses were 
short indicate that most, if not all, arrival aircraft were making visual approaches to the airports or runways. Air traffic 
data recorded at NASA currently includes radar tracks and flightplan information of associated aircraft but not 
unassociated tracks. FAA’s STARS CDR (Continuous Data Recording) data contains CA conflicts and associated as 
well as unassociated tracks but no flightplan information. Thus, we extracted unassociated tracks from the STARS 
CDR data and inserted them into the NASA-recorded data. Unassociated tracks with negative and zero altitudes were 
excluded. Inferred altitude clearances4 or temporary level-off altitudes for the associated flights were added to simulate 
altitude amendments in the recorded traffic data as if the level-off intent was available. This yields a complete set of 
associated and unassociated tracks with flightplan and altitude clearance intent information for the associated flights. 
Table 1  Safety Alert Conformance Thresholds for T-TSAFE and CA 
Setup 
Single Runway Parallel Runways of Separation d 
wake 
non-
wake 
d < 2500 ft 2500 ft < d < 4300 ft d > 4300 ft 
prior to and 
during turn-on 
blunder 
prior to 30º 
turn-on 
blunder not both on localizers 
T-TSAFE 
 0.85 0.75 0.75 𝑑/𝑟min 0.75 𝑑/𝑟min min{𝑑/𝑟min, 0.75} 
𝑡c < 40 seconds 𝑡c < 40 seconds and no alerts when both aircraft are on the localizers 
      CA 0.45 0.70 𝑑/𝑟min 
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In practice, only altitude clearances for conflict resolutions are needed, as altitude restrictions for waypoints on typical 
terminal procedures are available.  
Fast-time T-TSAFE simulations of the traffic data were performed with a real-time preprocessor of radar tracks as 
in Ref. 6. When an aircraft enters the TRACON, its track may get associated with a flightplan and become an 
associated track. On occasion, both the associated and unassociated tracks for the same aircraft may coexist for some 
period of time. As a result, CA confuses the associated and unassociated tracks as being two separate aircraft and 
therefore generate a conflict alert. This kind of “self alert” is clearly a false MCI alert that should not be issued to the 
controller. CA also generates alerts in which the identical associated and unassociated tracks cause conflicts with 
another aircraft simultaneously. The MCI alerts from the unassociated tracks are then redundant alerts. The 
preprocessor processes the unassociated tracks in real time without knowledge of future tracks. It may associate 
unassociated tracks with associated tracks by stitching based on position and velocity to avoid the self and redundant 
alerts. A table that maps unassociated and associated tracks and sometimes two unassociated tracks is generated by 
the preprocessor, which helps to identify STAR CA’s MCI conflict pairs extracted from STARS CDR data. 
 Post processing of the XML outputs of T-TSAFE allows generation of statistics of T-TSAFE MCI and non-MCI 
alerts. Past analyses using recorded real-world air traffic data have assumed all arriving flights to be conducting ILS 
approaches because visual approach intent information is generally not available.4 Analysis has also been done from 
fast-time simulation of recorded air traffic data from Human-In-The-Loop experiments.5  The results of both analyses 
determine the false-alert rates are ~10% for T-TSAFE when ILS approaches are assumed. Knowing the false-alert rate 
of T-TSAFE will allow estimation of the nuisance-alert rate of STARS CA. Furthermore, assuming the visual 
approaches as ILS approaches will increase the number of separation alerts and thus increase the alert pairs common 
to both T-TSAFE and STARS CA. Examination of these common alert pairs will test the safety alert thresholds, 
showing why they may be valid separation alerts but may not be good safety alerts when visual approaches are taken 
into account. Thus, we performed simulations assuming the arriving flights as either ILS or visual approaches. 
However, we would not be able to identify when the visual approaches were issued. This amounts to the assumption 
that there were no violations of the standard separations, or the number of violations is negligibly small, before the 
visual approaches were issued.  
IV. Results 
The alerts on conflict pairs for T-TSAFE are analyzed and compared with those of STARS CA for two scenarios: 
(1) when all the DFW arrivals are assumed to be on ILS and (2) when they are assumed to be on visual approaches. 
In making the comparison, the alerts for T-TSAFE and STARS CA are classified into Loss of Separation (LOS), non-
LOS, and non-T-TSAFE alert pairs for both MCI and non-MCI alerts. If the predicted loss of separation actually 
materializes later, the alert is called an “LOS alert”. On the other hand, if the LOS prediction is not followed by an 
actual loss of separation, the alert is called a “non-LOS alert”. A non-LOS alert may be a valid rather than false alert, 
as there could have been controller or pilot intervention after the alert was generated. For safety alerts, we still use this 
classification with the understanding that an LOS alert would mean the aircraft pair was predicted to violate the safety 
thresholds and was later detected to actually violate those thresholds. From a different perspective, the alerts are also 
grouped into DFW and non-DFW alerts. If at least one aircraft arrives into or departs from DFW, the alert pair is 
called a DFW alert pair, otherwise it is a non-DFW alert pair. For convenience, the alert pairs that are common to both 
T-TSAFE and STARS CA are referred to as “common conflict pairs”. 
A. ILS Approach Simulation 
In this simulation and analysis, no visual approach intent information is assumed and all arriving flights to DFW 
are assumed to be on ILS approaches, so the standard separation thresholds apply. 
 
1. Alert Rate 
 The alert rate in terms of the number of conflict pairs per hour was determined and analyzed. It is expected that 
most DFW arriving flights violate the standard separation because the input data contains aircraft that were mostly 
conducting visual approaches. By assuming all aircraft conducting ILS approaches, T-TSAFE generates valid 
separation alerts with about 10% false alert rate.4,5 By increasing the number of separation alerts and studying the 
conflict pairs that are common to both T-TSAFE and CA, we can estimate the nuisance-alert rate of CA. 
Figure 6 shows the alert rates per hour for T-TSAFE and STARS CA classified in terms of LOS, non-LOS, and 
non-TTSAFE alert pairs for both MCI and non-MCI alerts. Also indicated in the different STARS CA alert bars are 
the proportions of common conflict pairs. As in the case of CARTS CA,6 the common conflict pairs are only a small 
percentage of the total STARS CA alerts. If we assume a small percentage of T-TSAFE alerts are false, the percentage 
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of false alerts for STARS CA will still be large. 
For non-MCI alerts, the common conflict pairs are 
21% of the total non-MCI alerts. The other 79% 
of STARS non-MCI alerts are completely 
different pairs from those of T-TSAFE non-MCI 
alerts. Since T-TSAFE is able to detect any LOS 
by design,4 the 79% non-common conflict pairs 
for STARS CA would not be at losses of 
separation when the alerts were predicted. The 
time to the predicted conflicts would thus be about 
40 seconds if we consider STARS CA predicts 
conflicts with ~1NM alert threshold and an 
approach speed of ~200 knots. This time is on the 
border of the look-ahead time of CA and thus the 
alerts have large possibility of being nuisance. 
Considering a 10% false alert rate for T-TSAFE,4,5 
it is conceivable that the non-common conflict 
pairs of STARS CA would have a nuisance-alert 
rate of 90%. Then, the total nuisance-alert rate of 
STARS CA non-MCI alerts could be estimated as 
(0.1*21% + 0.9*79%) = 73%, which is about 10% improvement over CARTS CA. Similarly deduced 80% nuisance-
alert rate for CARTS CA5 was consistent with the FAA analysis.7 The number of MCI alerts for STARS CA is also 
significantly smaller than that for CARTS CA, although one should be careful in making comparison here, since SCT 
has more airports, especially small airports where MCI alerts dominate. The MCI alerts for T-TSAFE are only about 
24% of those STARS CA alerts, a 76% reduction. This is a bigger reduction than the 55% for SCT.6 The common 
conflict pairs for MCI alerts of STARS CA constitute about 10% of the total MCI alerts of STARS CA.  
Figure 6 also shows that the number of T-TSAFE non-MCI alerts is significantly more than that of STARS CA 
alerts, whereas similar comparison with CARTS CA was not as significant.5 This difference is attributed to the fact 
that essentially all of the DFW arrivals were making visual approaches, while the ratio of visual to ILS approaches in 
the SCT data was not as high. The number of non-MCI alerts depends on the degree of mixing of visual and ILS 
approaches in the input traffic data. 
Figure 7 shows the alerts per hour for both T-TSAFE and STARS CA, grouped by MCI and non-MCI as well as 
DFW and non-DFW alerts. The T-TSAFE non-MCI bar indicates that about 97% of T-TSAFE non-MCI alerts are 
DFW alerts, whereas the T-TSAFE MCI bar 
indicates that only about 12% of T-TSAFE MCI 
alerts are DFW alerts. On the other hand, the CA 
non-MCI bar indicates that about 40% of CA non-
MCI alerts are DFW alerts whereas the CA MCI bar 
indicates that about 3% of CA MCI alerts are DFW 
alerts. The large percentage of DFW non-MCI 
alerts for T-TSAFE is expected, as there are a lot 
more DFW arrivals than other small airports in D10 
and those arrivals are on visual approaches and thus 
would violate the standard separation thresholds. 
The percentage of DFW alerts for STARS CA is 
relatively small compared with the non-DFW alerts, 
indicating there might be some suppression of DFW 
alerts. The small percentage CA MCI DFW alerts 
also suggest that small airports are more susceptible 
to MCI alerts. 
To summarize, in this ILS approach simulation using mostly visual approach traffic data as input, due to the use 
of flight intent information, T-TSAFE is able to predict the large number of expected conflicts with a false alert rate 
of ~10% based on previous analyses.4,5 On the other hand, as would be expected, STARS CA does not help the 
controllers in aircraft separation. The alert pairs generated by STARS CA are mostly different from those of T-TSAFE, 
and the nuisance-alert rate is estimated to be about 70%. The flight intent information T-TSAFE used also reduced 
the MCI alerts by 76% as compared to STARS CA. 
 
Figure 7. T-TSAFE and STARS CA alerts in terms of 
DFW and non-DFW alerts. 
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Figure 6. T-TSAFE and STARS CA alerts in terms of LOS, 
non-LOS, and non-TTSAFE alerts with common conflict 
pairs shown on the CA bars. 
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2. Common Conflict Pairs 
As discussed above, only about 21% of non-MCI pairs alerted by STARS CA were also alerted by T-TSAFE. 
More specifically, among 83 STARS CA non-MCI pairs, there were 17 pairs that also got alerted by T-TSAFE. These 
83 pairs included 18 pairs that STARS CA identified as MCI alerts but that were actually non-MCI alerts. They 
contained 14 pairs of redundant alerts and 4 pairs of self alerts.  
Further examination of the tracks of the 17 common conflict pairs would help understanding the nature of the 
conflicts and how the flightplan and visual approach intent information as well as the safety alert thresholds in T-
TSAFE may eliminate many of these alerts and the majority of other non-MCI alerts. The common conflict pairs may 
be grouped into parallel-runway and non-parallel-runway pairs. The conflict pairs involving arriving flights 
approaching parallel runways are parallel-runway pairs. Parallel-runway pairs can be further classified into three 
kinds, depending on whether they approach the runways from opposite sides without track crossing, from the same 
side, or from opposite sides with track crossing. Among the 17 common conflict pairs, 14 pairs are parallel-runway 
and three are non-parallel runway pairs. 
There were seven common conflict pairs that 
were parallel-runway pairs approaching from 
opposite sides of the runways without track crossing. 
Figure 8 shows an example of such conflicts. Aircraft 
ABC128 conducted a visual approach to runway 18R 
at DFW while aircraft ABC1390 simultaneously 
conducted a visual approach to runway 17C. The 
separation between runways 18R and 17C is 1.5 NM 
or 9100 ft. The squares indicate the waypoints for the 
nominal interior routes (NIRs).4 NIRs are prescribed 
nominal TRACON paths from the arrival meter fixes 
down to the runways. They have been used in past 
air traffic automation efforts9 and are in the 
adaptation of the Traffic Management Advisor 
(TMA),10 a time-based automated tool used to 
maximize airport efficiency. The circles are 3 NM in 
diameter and represent the point of first LOS. The 
stars represent time progression in one-minute 
intervals near the loss of separation. Aircraft 
ABC128 was descending below 4000 ft while 
aircraft ABC1390 leveled off at 3000 ft temporarily 
(not shown), so they had lost the 1000 ft vertical 
separation standard and were not yet established on 
their localizers. Thus T-TSAFE predicts a loss of 
separation based on the standard separation 
thresholds about 84 seconds before the first LOS. 
The inset provides a closeup view of the region near 
the point of loss of separation, showing that ABC128 
crosses over the localizer (solid-line track) slightly. 
The safety alert thresholds discussed earlier may 
allow elimination of many of these parallel-runway 
alerts when the localizer overshoot is small and the 
other aircraft has sufficient separation. STARS CA 
alerts were triggered because dead reckoning was 
used. 
There were six common conflict pairs that were 
parallel-runway pairs approaching from the same 
side of the runway. Figure 9 shows an example of 
such conflicts. Aircraft EFG3245 conducted a visual 
approach to runway 17L at DFW while aircraft 
NOP365 simultaneously conducted a visual 
approach to runway 17C from the same side. The 
  
Figure 8. Ground tracks for two aircraft making visual 
approaches to the finals from opposite sides of the 
runways. 
 
Figure 9. Ground tracks for two aircraft making visual 
approaches to the finals from the same side of the 
runways. 
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separation between runways 17L and 17C is 0.82 NM or 5000 ft. Again the squares indicate the waypoints for the 
NIRs and the circles are 3 NM in diameter and represent the first LOS. The stars represent time progression in one 
minute intervals near the first LOS. Aircraft EFG3245 was just descending below 4000 ft while NOP365 maintains 
3000 ft temporarily (not shown), so they had lost the 1000 ft vertical separation standard while they were not yet 
established on their localizers. Thus T-TSAFE predicted a loss of separation based on the standard separation 
thresholds about 75 seconds before the first LOS. However this would be a nuisance alert if one considered that the 
aircraft were conducting visual approaches; the nuisance alert can be eliminated if we apply the safety alert thresholds. 
STARS CA generated an alert here even though the alert threshold was only 0.7 of the runway separation because 
STARS CA relys upon dead-reckoning trajectory predictions.  
Figure 10 shows one common conflict pair 
observed belonging to parallel-runway pairs 
approaching from opposite sides with track crossing. 
Aircraft ABC1433 conducted a visual approach to 
runway 17R at DFW while aircraft EFG3221 
simultaneously conducted a visual approach to 
runway 18R. The separation between runways 17R 
and 18R is 1.25 NM or 6100 ft. Aircraft EFG3221 
was maintaining 4000 ft and ABC1433 was 
maintaining 3000 ft temporarily while  they were 
turning onto the localizer, but both started to descend 
before being established on their localizers (not 
shown). Accordingly T-TSAFE predicted a conflict 
when they started descending based on the standard 
separation about 13 seconds before the first LOS. If 
the visual approach intent information is available, 
the visual alert thresholds may eliminate this alert as 
well, even though CA triggers an alert with a 
horizontal threshold equal to 70% of the runway 
separation. 
The rest of the three common conflict pairs are 
non-parallel-runway pairs. Two of them appear to be 
valid alerts, and one seems to be a false alert. Figure 
11 shows the ground tracks for one of the encounters. 
Aircraft CDE4217 was a flight departing Dallas Love 
Field  (DAL), and aircraft NOP715 was a VFR 
departure flight from Addison (ADS) airport. RNAV 
departure routes were not available for either flight. 
The squares are waypoints from the flightplans. The 
circles are 1.5 NM in diameter for VFR separation 
threshold and represent first LOS. Aircraft NOP715 
climbed and then leveled at 3300 ft. Aircraft 
CDE4217 climbed to 3000 ft and leveled there (not 
shown). They lost horizontal separation of 1.5 NM 
and vertical separation of 500 ft. T-TSAFE predicts 
the LOS with a lead time of 52 seconds. VFR flight 
NOP715 should have been leveled at 3500 ft to avoid 
the conflict. Thus, this is a valid alert which both T-
TSAFE and STARS CA issued.  
Figure 12 shows the ground tracks for another non-parallel-runway conflict pair between a departure and an arrival 
flight. Aircraft NOP330 was an IFR departure from ADS and was climbing from about 1000 ft before the conflict. 
Aircraft STU4062 was an arrival to DAL and was temperarily level at 3000 ft. The circles are 3 NM in diameter. The 
horizontal and vertical separations were lost briefly before the aircraft entered into diverging courses that resolved the 
conflict. Aircraft NOP330 did not have an RNAV departure route available, and aircraft STU4062 did not follow its 
NIR closely in an apparent visual approach to runway 13R at DAL. T-TSAFE alerts about 40 seconds before the first 
LOS. This is a valid alert which STARS CA issued as well.  
 
Figure 11. Ground tracks for a conflict pair involving a 
departure (CDE4217) and another VFR departure 
(NOP715). 
 
Figure 10. Ground tracks for two aircraft making visual 
approaches to the finals from opposite sides of the 
runways with tracks crossed. 
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Figure 13 shows the ground tracks for another 
non-parallel-runway conflict pair between two 
arriving flights, which turns out to be a false alert. 
Aircraft EFG3071 was an arrival to DFW on visual 
approach to runway 17L. Aircraft NOP451 was an 
arrival to DAL on visual approach to runway 13R. 
The circles are 3 NM in diameter. The solid lines are 
the predicted trajectories. The aircraft were both 
descending at the same altitude. As can be seen, the 
actual tracks never lose horizontal separation of 3 
NM, so this was a false alert. This false alert was 
due to an inaccurate prediction of the horizontal 
trajectory of aircraft NOP451 as a result of 
assuming visual as ILS approach. For ILS approach, 
it has been assumed that the aircraft attempts to 
avoid intercepting the localizer too close to the final 
approach fix.  
Examination of the encounters in the above 
figures shows that, for most cases, T-TSAFE 
provides proper separation alerts with good lead 
times. On the other hand, the alerts provided by 
STARS CA based on dead reckoning and smaller 
thresholds would be too late to be useful for 
separation. Furthermore, even many of these 
common conflict pairs are likely nuisance alerts if 
we take into account the fact that the flights are 
conducting visual approaches. As shown next, with 
flight intent information including visual 
approaches, proper safety alert thresholds could be 
designed to eliminate many of these nuisance alerts 
in addition to other T-TSAFE alerts, which would 
be nuisance  when visual approaches are 
considered.  
B. Visual Approach Simulation 
In this simulation and analysis, all arriving 
flights to DFW are assumed to be conducting visual 
approaches with the safety alert thresholds applied. 
This is consistent with the clear VMC weather and 
the short final approach courses observed in the 
recorded traffic data. It is assumed that no loss of 
separation occurs before the visual approach 
clearances are issued.  
 
1. Alert Rate  
Figure 14 shows the alerts per hour for T-
TSAFE separated into LOS and non-LOS alert 
pairs. As mentioned earlier, an LOS alert here 
should mean the aircraft pair was predicted to 
violate the safety thresholds and was later detected 
to actually violate those thresholds. Compared with 
Fig. 6, the number of non-MCI alerts is less by 
92%. The STARS CA results are also shown with 
the common conflict pairs indicated as well. As 
expected, there is no change in the percentage of 
common conflict pairs for the MCI alerts. The 
 
Figure 14. TTSAFE and STARS CA alerts in terms of 
LOS, non-LOS, and non-TTSAFE when visual approach 
intent information and safety alert thresholds are used. 
 
Figure 12. Ground tracks for a conflict pair involving an 
IFR departure (NOP330) and an arrival (STU4062). 
 
Figure 13. Ground tracks for a conflict pair involving a 
DFW arrival (EFG3071) and a DAL arrival (NOP451). 
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percentage for the non-MCI alerts are considerably lower, as most of  the T-TSAFE non-MCI alerts involving DFW 
arrivals have been eliminated. The number of alert pairs for T-TSAFE are considerably fewer than those of STARS 
CA for both MCI and non-MCI alerts. This result should dispel the notion that T-TSAFE might not improve much 
over CARTS CA as some have concluded from Refs. 5 and 6 due to the seemingly high T-TSAFE non-MCI bar in 
figures similar to Fig. 6. The result also shows the effectiveness of the flight intent and the safety alert thresholds. 
 
2. Common Conflict Pairs 
It is interesting to see what effects the safety alert thresholds have on the previous 17 common conflict pairs in the 
ILS approach simulation experiment examined in Sec. IV.A.2. It turns out only one parallel-runway alert pair and the 
three non-parallel-runway alert pairs survive. This is the case even though the safety alert thresholds for T-TSAFE is 
larger than those of STARS CA. The non-parallel-runway pairs are expected to survive since they do not involve 
visual approach DFW flights. This result shows that 14 of the parallel-runway pairs were reduced to just one, a 93% 
reduction.  
Figure 15 shows the ground tracks for the common parallel-runway conflict pair that remains in the visual approach 
simulation experiment. The solid and dashed curves are the actual ground tracks of aircraft ABC128 and ABC1390, 
respectively, with the arrows indicating the directions of flight. The squares are the waypoints, with the bottom two 
waypoints being the runway thresholds for runways 
18R and 17C. The dark solid lines are the predicted 
trajectories for the two aircraft starting from their 
current positions to the predicted positions of violation 
of the safety alert thresholds. The circles are both of 
diameter 1.5 NM, the separation between the two 
parallel runways. At the moment, aircraft ABC1390 
was still levelling at 3000 ft temporarily while aircraft 
ABC128 was descending at about 300 ft higher. There 
were only two predictions and no actual violations of 
the safety thresholds were observed as aircraft 
ABC128 quickly turned back to the localizer and 
started descending. Ultimately it is up to the 
controllers to decide whether this is a valid or nuisance 
alert, because even though aircraft ABC128 did 
overshoot the localizer, it is unlikely to cause any 
action by the controller. However, should ABC 128 
continue to blunder, this alert would be valuable. 
While the safety alert thresholds should be tuned 
further in real applications based on the total number 
of alerts tolerable to the controllers, they are certainly 
a good starting point. 
 
3. Other parallel-runway alerts 
T-TSAFE also generated two additional parallel-
runway DFW alert pairs that STARS-CA did not alert. 
It is interesting to examine the validity of these 
parallel-runway alerts as well. 
Figure 16 shows the ground tracks for a pair of 
DFW arrivals, ABC1458 and ABC2516, making 
visual approaches to runways 17C and 18R 
respectively from the same side. The solid and dashed 
lines are the actual trajectories of aircraft ABC1458 
and ABC2516, respectively. The stars are positions 
separated one minute apart leading to the positions of 
horizontal closest approach. The squares are 
waypoints of the NIRs leading to the runway 
thresholds near the arrows, which indicate the 
direction of flight. The dark solid lines are predicted 
trajectories of the aircraft from their current poisitions 
 
Figure 16. Ground tracks for an arrival pair making 
visual final approaches from the same side of the 
runways. 
 
Figure 15. Real and predicted ground tracks for an 
arrival pair making visual final approaches to runways 
18R and 17C. 
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to the first predicted violation of the visual conformance alert threshold of 0.5. The predicted violation positions are 
the center of the circles of diameter 1.5 NM, corresponding to the runway separation. The alert lasted two radar update 
cycles and disappeared quickly as aircraft ABC2516 turned back to the localizer. The aircraft never actually violated 
the conformance alert threshold of 0.5. This is in the same gray area as Fig. 15. Aircraft ABC2516 drifted off the 
localizer significantly, but the alert did not last long as the aircraft quickly turned back to the localizer. STARS CA 
did not alert for this pair due to its smaller alert thresholds. 
 Figure 17 shows the ground tracks of aircraft ABC1213 and ABC2371, which conducted final approaches to 
parallel runways 17C and 17R respectively from opposite sides. The weight classes of both aircraft are “large”, so 
wake turbulence separation rules do not apply.  The runways are separated by only 1300 ft. The squares are waypoints 
of the NIRs, which end at the runway thresholds near the arrows for the flight directions. The solid and dashed lines 
are the actual trajectories for aircraft ABC1213 and ABC2371 respectively. The dark solid lines are predicted 
trajectories starting from the current positions to the 
first predicted violation of the safety conformance 
alert  threshold of 0.75 for aircraft approaching 
parallel runways less than 2500 ft apart but not yet 
established on their final approach courses. The 
circles are of diameter 2.25 NM (75% of 3 NM). Note 
that, once the aircraft are established on their final 
approach courses, there will not be alerts even if the 
succeeding aircraft moves forward to a nearly side-
by-side position with zero vertical separation. In this 
case, aircraft ABC2371 did not move forward as 
indicated by the stars, which are one minute apart. At 
the current position where the trajectories were 
predicted, they leveled temporarily at 3000 ft. The 
predictions disappeared when aircraft ABC237 
continued the base  turn. This alert may again be on 
the gray area between valid and nuisance alerts. A 
small  number of this kind of alert may be acceptible 
to the controller. It also shows that the aircraft made 
the turn to maintian proper reduced separation for 
visual approaches. STARS CA did not alert for this 
pair. The inset provides a close-up view of the 
encounter.  
We notice from the predicted trajectories that the headings of aircraft ABC128 in Fig. 15, ABC2516 in Fig.16, and 
ABC2371 in Fig. 17 all lag behind their actual headings at their starting positions of the predicted conflicts. This 
lagging is a result of the filtering algorithms used in the NASA recorded data. Without the heading lag, the three alerts 
may not appear and the safety alert thresholds may be increased further to provide larger alert lead time without 
proliferating nuisance alerts. 
V. Conclusion 
A set of safety alert thresholds, which allow safety alerts to be provided to the controllers for aircraft conducting 
visual approaches to a single runway or multiple parallel runways, has been proposed based on input from Subject 
Matter Experts as well as visual approach procedures and common practices. The goal is to maximize the thresholds 
within the guidance of the procedures and common practices and to minimize the number of nuisance alerts and total 
number of alerts with the support of flight intent information. Tests have been performed using a recently developed 
prototype tactical separation assurance system for terminal airspace, called Terminal Tactical Separation-Assured 
Flight Environment (T-TSAFE). The input was a full day of air traffic data from Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON 
with most arriving flights conducting visual approaches. The results compare favorably with those of the Conflict 
Alert (CA) functionality of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS). 
When fast-time simulation experiment was performed using T-TSAFE with all arriving flights assumed to conduct 
instrument approaches, the expected large number of separation alerts were observed. When compared with STARS 
CA, the conflict pairs common to both T-TSAFE and STARS CA was only 21% of the total STARS CA alerts. As a 
result, the nuisance-alert rate for STARS CA was estimated to be about 70%, which is comparable to a similar previous 
 
Figure 17. Ground tracks for an arrival pair making 
visual final approaches to two parallel runways less than 
2500 ft apart from opposite sides with track crossing. 
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estimation of 80% nuisance-alert rate for CARTS (Common Automated Radar Terminal System) CA. The Mode-C 
Intruder (MCI) alerts were also reduced by 76% as compared to STARS CA.  
Examination of the common conflict pairs between T-TSAFE and STARS CA shows that they are valid separation 
conflicts with good alert lead times for T-TSAFE. However, many of them would still be considered nuisance alerts 
if the aircraft were conducting visual approaches. This was confirmed by another visual approach fast-time simulation 
T-TSAFE experiment, in which all DFW arriving flights were assumed to be on visual approaches and our proposed 
safety alert thresholds were used and tested. The result of the experiment showed that the number of non-MCI alerts 
was less by 92% as compared to the number when all DFW arrivals were assumed to be conducting instrument 
approaches. The common conflict pairs involving aircraft conducting visual approaches to parallel runways were 
reduced by 93% as well. Thus, the flight intent information and the safety alert thresholds are effective in reducing 
nuisance alerts. 
T-TSAFE can thus provide separation and safety conflict alerts seamlessly in the real-world environment of mixed 
terminal operations with arriving flights of both visual and instrument approaches. Compared with STARS CA, T-
TSAFE has fewer false alerts, larger alert lead time, and larger alert thresholds. While the nuisance alerts are reduced 
significantly with the safety alert thresholds, further work is needed to study if the alert lead time for safety alerts is 
sufficient.  
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